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Damage From Aerial Crop Dusting
Chemical weed control by aerial crop dusting has be-
come a very common practice in agricultural commu-
nities, even though the practice involves an unavoid-
able hazard of damage to neighbors' crops. After
discussing the technological problems of crop dusting,
and the legal problems of imposing liability for dam-
age caused by a crop dusting operation, the author of
this Note concludes that legal responsibility for this
damage should be governed by principles of absolute
liability.
IN LITTLE more than a quarter-century since it first came
into commercial use, crop dusting' has become extremely important
to the producers of many agricultural crops. Both experimental*
and commercials application has shown the process to be an effec-
tive and relatively inexpensive method of killing weeds, thereby
substantially increasing production. As early as 1951, about one-
ninth of the total acreage under cultivation in the United States was
being treated by aerial crop dusting.4
1. References to "crop dusting" are to chemical weed control in general, whether
the chemical is applied in dust or spray form.
2. In an experiment conducted in Texas in 1950, cotton treated with DDT spray
produced 1220 pounds per acre more than untreated cotton. This was equal to a
pecuniary increase of almost $133 per acre, or almost enough to pay for the land.
Gaines, Use of Airplane in Cotton Insect Control, First Annual Texas Agricultural
Aviation Conference and Short Course on Pest Control B-i, B-4 (March 31 and
April 1, 1952) [hereinafter cited as 1st Ann. TAACI.
3. In 1953, crop dusting was credited with increasing the California rice crop
yield by 30 to 40%, and with the production of an additional 1,500,000 bushels of
wheat from 500,000 acres in Canada. Authorities also estimated a 15% increase in
Iowa corn production, and 20 to 25% improvement in Oklahoma livestock pasture
land. Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REv. 69,
70 at nn.11-13 (1953).
4. Weick, Some General Facts Regarding Agricultural Aviation, Second Annual
Texas Agricultural Aviation Conference and Short Course on Pest Control A-1 (Feb-
ruary 23 and 24, 1953).
Ground application has also been tried, but it has proven to be more time
consuming and less successful than aerial crop dusting, and is therefore considered
generally impractical For example, in attempting to weed out the coffee bean plant
from a field of growing rice, ground application is impractical because (1) the rice
can be injured by persons and objects moving through the field, and (2) the fields
are covered with water, so as to make such movement difficult. Hand weeding
is even less practical, since in addition to these factors there is the added labor
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The development of 2,4-D and other selective herbicides5 has
been an important factor in increasing the effectiveness of chemical
weed control. Since these chemicals destroy broad-leafed plants but
do no harm to many narrow-leafed species," they often can be used
effectively to kill weeds among growing crops. For example, selec-
tive herbicides will kill the broad-leafed coffee bean plants which
commonly infest rice crops, without harming the rice. But crop
dusting always involves a substantial danger that the chemical will
"drift" from the area of treatment onto nearby crops that are suscep-
tible to its destructive qualities, 7 where it can cause extensive
damage"
The purpose of this Note is (1) to discuss the technological prob-
lems of crop dusting that bear on issues of negligence, so far as
negligence principles govern crop dusting damage cases, and (2) to
examine theories of legal responsibility for crop dusting damage
and determine whether liability should follow only from negligence
or whether there should be liability without fault.
TEcHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
Herbicides
A herbicide will destroy an entire weed plant when it is trans-
located, that is, distributed through the plant by the plant's own
physiological processes. Since effective translocation requires that
parts of the leaf remain uninjured to assist in the translocation
expense. Interview with Dr. Richard Behrens, Associate Professor of Agronomy,
University of Minnesota, Director of the University of Minnesota Weed Control
Project, December 31, 1958.
5. Herbicides, or plant killing chemicals, are either "selective" or "nonselective,"
the former being used to kill only certain undesirable plants, while the latter kills
all plant life indiscriminately. Fawn, CHmIMsTRY OF TILE PESTICIDES 370 (3d ed.
1955).
Among the most commonly used selective herbicides are 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacotic
acid (2,4-D), 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T) and 2 methyl 4 chlorophon-
oxyacetic acid (MCP).
6. See FaEAR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 371. Rice, wheat and corn are a few of the
typical narrow-leafed plants; cotton, peas, tomatoes, grapes and many kinds of
garden weeds are some of the common broad-leafed plants.
7. Behrens, Cotton Responses to Some Herbicides Used in Brush and Weed
Control, Fourth Annual Texas Agricultural Aviation Conference and Short Course
on Pest Control E-1 (February 21 and 22, 1955).
8. Even though other crops may not be damaged, the spraying operations may
result in the deposit of poisons on them in amounts greater than allowed by the
Federal Food and Drug laws. If this were true, the crops so poisoned would be
subject to confiscation. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 342, 346(a) (Supp. 1958).
In some cases damage has resulted to animals or bees. See, e.g., Sanders v. Beck-
with, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235 (1955); Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P.2d
454 (1948); Lenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949). In one case it was possibly a factor in the death of a human being. See Reed
v. Coyner Crop Dusters, 83 Ariz. 153, 317 P.2d 944 (1957).
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process, the spray must be applied in coarse droplets to avoid cover-
ing the entire leaf. Without translocation, some parts of the weed are
not killed.9
Since the concentrated acid 2,4-D is insoluble it is not used as a
herbicide, but it is the basic material from which several soluble
derivatives are produced.10 Inorganic salts, amine salts and esters
are three common herbicide derivatives. Inorganic salts are occa-
sionally used for dry chemical applications, but they are generally
undesirable for sprays because of their limited solubility with most
spray bases. Although 2,4-D esters are slightly more effective than
amine salts, they tend to give off poisonous fumes that may damage
plants a considerable distance from the application site." Therefore,
amine salt sprays are preferable when susceptible crops are grown
near the treated fields.'-
Drift
The two principal natural causes of spray drift are convection
and wind. Convection, the upward currents of air resulting from
differences between ground and air temperature as the sun heats
the earth, may suspend particles of the spray long enough even for
light winds to carry them onto other lands' 3 Moreover, sudden
changes both in wind direction and velocity may cause spray to
drift during any spraying operation.'4 Since neither wind nor con-
vection can be controlled or accurately predicted, the danger of
9. For a good discussion of this technical problem see FARan, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 369-92.
10. FaEAa, op. cit. supra note 5, at 371-76; DE ONG, INswcr, FuN'us AND EEDo
CONTROL 235 (1953).
11. This higher "volatility" of esters results from their relatively low molecular
weight See FBEAr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 374.
12. FRAR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 372-74; DE ONG, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 235.
13. See BRowN, INSEcT CONTROL BY CmEac.IALs 4554-6 (1951). Since the differ-
ence between ground and air temperature is normally lowest just before sunrise or
after sunset, drift from convection is less likely to result from spraying operations
at those times.
14. Interview with Dr. Richard Behrens, supra note 4. Realizing the importance
of this factor, researchers have devised tables suggesting safe wind velocities in
relation to the proximity of crops susceptible to the material being sprayed. For
example, in 1956 it was suggested that at the following given wind velocities spray
was likely to drift the following distances:
Wind Velocity Downwind Upwind
0-3 m.p.h. 1 mile 3; mile
4-6 m.p.h. 2 miles %i mile
7-10 m.p.h. 4 miles 250 feet
Darrow, Aerial Applications of Herbicides in Brush and Weed Control, SnoRT COURSE
OsTrcE, A. & M. COL.LEGE OF TEXAS, HANDBOOK oN AERIAL APP.icATIoN N Amm-
CUzTURE 97, 103 (1956). While strict adherence to these suggestions will not wholly
eliminate the possibility of drift damage, it would appear at least to indicate care in
relation to this important aspect of the crop dusting operation.
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drift damage to crops on nearby lands can never be completely
avoided.15
Most herbicides are available either as dusts or sprays, but sprays
are preferred both for effectiveness and safety.16 Although dust drift
is considered very difficult to control in winds over 3 miles per
hour,17 sprays can be used in winds up to 10 or 15 miles per hour. 8
The size of the spray droplets is also important, since smaller drop-
lets drift more readily than larger ones.' 9 Droplet size is measured in
microns, 100 to 150 microns being ideal for effective weed control.
Although increasing the size of the droplet might somewhat hinder
adequate coverage of the weeds, 300 to 450 micron droplets should
be used to reduce the danger of drift where nearby crops are
susceptible to the particular spray.20
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CROP DUSTING DAMAGE
Courts have reached fairly uniform results in aerial crop dusting
cases. An injured party who has proved that his damage was caused
by the spraying, and who was not at fault himself, has almost invari-
ably recovered.2' But the theories of recovery adopted by the courts
have been far from uniform.
Negligence
Most crop dusting cases are negligence actions brought by the
owners of injured crops against both the applicator of the chemical
15. In the interview with Dr. Richard Behrens, supra note 4, it was pointed out
that the unavoidable danger of drift is a fact well recognized among authorities on
herbicides.
16. See Gaines, supra note 2, at B-1.
In 1948 the Civil Aeronautics Administration prohibited the use of 2,4-D in dust
form, without restricting its continued use as a spray. CAA Bulletin No. CAA-277,
June 24, 1948, 9 CnL AERONAuTIcs JOURNAL 84 (1948).
17. Barden, How to Determine Distribution Patterns of Your Equipment, Pro-
ceedings of the Sixth Annual Indiana-Ohio Aerial and Ground Applicators' Confer-
ence 48, 48 (February 27 to March 1, 1957).
18. Gaines, supra note 2, at B-2.
19. McCully, Some Fundamentals of Chemical Brush and Weed Control, SionT
COURSE OFFIcE, A. & M. COLLEGE OF TEXAS, HANDBOOK ON AERIAL APPLICATION
iN AGaICULTURE 92, 95-96 (1956).
20. Darrow, supra note 14, at 99. More detailed recommendations are available
from drift tables prepared as a result of research into the causes of drift. See
Barden, supra note 17, at 44. The following table is presented there, showing the
drift factor at various droplet sizes, falling 10 feet through air movement of 3 m.p.h.:







21. Thirty aerial crop dusting cases have reached appellate courts since 1933.
The plaintiff has recovered for his damage in twenty-one of these, while losing in
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and the owner of the land being treated.a The claim against the
landowner is generally based on vicarious liability for the negligence
of the applicator,23 and in only a few cases has the landowner been
held liable for failure to act as a reasonable and prudent person. 4
The landowner's vicarious liability has followed from the rule that
one cannot wholly delegate the legal responsibility for an "inher-
ently" or "intrinsically" dangerous act, even to an independent
contractor. 5
Courts consistently imply that the plaintiff can recover only after
proving that the spraying operation causing his damage was con-
ducted negligently,-6 and in most cases where the applicator is held
only nine. In three of these nine cases, the plaintiff's loss was based on governmental
immunity. See Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); Neff v.
Imperial Irrigation District, 142 Cal. App. 2d 755, 299 P.2d 359 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 958 (1956). In two (the "trespassing bee" cases) there was no
drift, and the plaintiff's damage was caused by his own negligence. See Lenk v.
Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Jeanes v. Holtz,
94 Cal. App. 2d 826, 211 P.2d 925 (Dist Ct. App. 1949). In Aim v. Johnson, 75
Idaho 521, 275 P.2d 959 (1954), the plaintiff failed to prove actual damage, and
the court refused to reverse for nominal damages only. In Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal.
App. 2d 188, 257 P.2d. 690 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), the plaintiff failed to prove
causation. In only two cases has an innocent plaintiff who proved causation failed
to recover. See Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir., 1951);
Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), These are discussed infra.
22. There has also been some attempt to hold the manufacturer of the chemical
liable, relying on the doctrine of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916). This doctrine is discussed in Paossmt, Torrs 499-500 (2d ed.
1955). Liability was successfully imposed upon the manufacturer under this doctrine
in Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949), 3
VAND. L. REv. 341 (1950); but two years later, in Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951), the opposite result was reached. In Walton the court
said that the manufacturer could not be held liable where the users of the product
understand its dangerous propensities. Since the Walton decision the dangerous
characteristics of 2,4-D have been considered matters of common knowledge to
farmers, and no more actions have been successfully maintained against the manu-
facturer.
23. See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953); Burke
v. Thomas, 313 P.2d 1082 (Olda. 1957). This rule also applies in ground spraying
cases. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Smith, 220 Ark. 223, 247
S.W.2d 16 (1952); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Lines R.R., 221 S.C. 477, 71 S.E.2d
299 (1952).
24. These are all ground applicator cases. See, e.g., Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562,
252 S.W.2d 289 (1952).
25. See Pnossmi, op. cit. supra note 22, at 359-61. In a recent Arkansas case,
Heeb v. Prysock, 219 Ark. 899, 245 S.W.2d 577 (1952), the defendant attempted
to escape this vicarious liability rule by alleging that he was not negligent in choos-
ing a recommended spray anda competent applicator, and that to hold him liable
in those circumstances would have the effect of making him an insurer. The court
rejected the argument without discussion.
26. See cases cited in note 27, infra. In Bums v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 2204
S.W.2d 365 (1949), the court stated that "one who uses a dust of this kind is not
liable to his neighbors in every case; negligence must be shown." Id. at 129, 224
S.W.2d at 365. In Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), the
plaintiff failed to recover because of his failure to prove negligence.
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to have acted negligently there is ample evidence that he did fail
to use reasonable care.21 However, only one court has held that
absent such evidence of negligence there can be no recovery. In
Vrazel v. Bieri,28 a Texas Civil Appeals Court case, the plaintiff
established the causal connection between the crop dusting and his
damage, but failed to prove that the defendants had in any way
acted unreasonably. On appeal from a judgment for the defendants,
the plaintiff argued that as a matter of law the existence of some
drift and resulting damage should be sufficient evidence of negli-
gence. The court rejected this contention because it would impose
strict liability on the defendants. But since the Vrazel court recog-
nized no doctrine of strict liability under Texas law, it did not
consider the question whether a crop dusting operation is distin-
guishable from activities that can lead to strict liability in other
jurisdictions.29 Therefore, this case is very poor authority to support
the proposition that absolute liability should not apply to crop
dusting damage cases.
Several courts have upheld findings of negligence which appar-
ently were based solely on evidence that some spray drifted onto
the plaintiffs land and caused damage.3 0 Perhaps these courts con-
sider the act of spraying, in itself, to be unreasonable.8 ' These
decisions, in effect, make the applicator and the landowner abso-
lutely liable for all damage caused by the crop dusting operation.
Strict Liability
Only one court has expressly applied strict liability concepts to
a crop dusting case. In Gotreaux v. Gary,32 the Supreme Court of
27. See, e.g., Heeb v. Prysock, 219 Ark. 889, 245 S.W.2d 577 (1952) (plane
flew over the plaintiff's crops and dusted them); W. B. Bynun Cooperage Co. v.
Coulter, 219 Ark. 818, 244 S.W.2d 955 (1952) (application done at a time when
the prevailing winds were possibly excessive, and the hiring landowners were not
sure if the plane was equipped with a proper cut-off mechanism); McKennon v.
Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1951) (plane flew over and dusted the
plaintiff's apiary); Burns v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949) (applica-
tion done at a time when the winds were excessive); Hammond Ranch Corp. v.
Dodson, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.2d 484 (1940) (plane flew over the plaintiff's
crops and dusted them); Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231
(1953) (plane flew over the plaintiff's crops and dusted them); Burke v. Thomas,
313 P.2d 1082 (Okla. 1957) (plane overshot flagmen who were marking the
boundaries of the fields to be treated and flew over and dusted the plaintiff's crops).
28. 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
29. Id. at 151-52.
30. See, e.g., Adams v. Henning, 117 Cal. App. 2d 376, 255 P.2d 456 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1953); Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957); Schultz v. Harless, 271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (ground
application).
31. Some courts have reached the same result by finding negligence in spraying
at a time when it was "reasonably forseeable" that the landowner's neighbors might
be injured. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P.2d 454 (1948); Miles
v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
32. 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957), 32 TUL. L. R-v. 146.
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Louisiana held that the defendants were liable "irrespective of the
fact that the activities resulting in damages [were] conducted with
assumed reasonable care and in accordance with modem and
accepted methods." 13 In that case, the plaintiff was raising cotton
and peas about three miles from the defendant-landowner's rice
crops. Immediately after the rice was sprayed, a high wind arose
and carried some of the 2,4-D spray onto the plaintiff's crops, caus-
ing nearly $2500 damage. The trial court found no sufficient evidence
of negligence in the spraying operation, and dismissed the plaintiff's
actions against both the applicator and the defendant-landowner
On appeal, the state supreme court said:
Rice is one of the most important crops of Louisiana and its proper culti-
vation necessitates the application of herbicides. However, plaintiff could
not be deprived of the privilege of raising to production his cotton and
pea crops because of defendants' use of spraying operations.34
The court reversed the lower court's judgment, reasoning that "negli-
gence or fault, in these instances, is not a requisite to liability."
Two concepts of the strict liability doctrine prevail among Ameri-
can courts. The Rylands v. Fletcher3" rule requires damage caused
by "non-natural" use of the defendant's land,37 while the rule of the
33. Id. at 378, 94 So. 2d at 295 (1957). See also Chapman Chemical Co. v.
Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 643-44, 222 S.W.2d 820, 827 (1949), where the manufacturer
of a 2,4-D dust was held liable to the plaintiff %vho was injured by spray drifting
onto his crops. The Arkansas court relied heavily on Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.
2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948), for the proposition that "if one casts into the air a
substance which he knows may do damage to others, and in some circumstances
will certainly do so .. . and if he releases such a substance either from ignor-
ance of, or in indifference to the damage that may be done, the rule of strict
liability should be applied." The Luthringer case adopted the ultrahazardous activity
rule of the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENr, ToRTs §§ 519-24 (1938). Al-
though the Chapman case is no longer the law on liability of 2,4-D manufacturers
(see note 22 supra), it may still be reliable authority that in Arlmnsas, 2,4-D spraying
is within the doctrine of ultrahazardous activity which, under the Restatement rule,
would lead to absolute liability on the applicator or the hiring landowner. See
PnossER, SELEcrum Topics oN THE LAw op ToRTs 135, 155 at n.137 (1953).
34. 232 La. at 377, 94 So. 2d at 294.
35. Id. at 378, 94 So. 2d at 295. This holding was restated in Jones v. ,Morgan,
96 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 1957), where the spraying was found to have been
done negligently. The court stated that the evidence was suflicient to support a
finding of negligence, but such a finding was not necessary since strict liability
would apply. Id. at 113.
36. Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), reversing 3 H. & C. 774, 159
Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
37. In discussing the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, Professor Prosser has stated
that
despite some apparent confusion as to whether "natural" was used in the sense
of originating in the course of nature or merely ordinary, normal, customary
and common, it seems clear that the latter was the meaning intended....
In determining what is a "non-natural use" the English courts have looked
not only to the character of the thing or activity in question, but also to the
place and manner in which it is maintained and its relations to its surround-
ings....
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Restatement of Torts requires damage resulting from some "ultra-
hazardous activity" which is "not a matter of common usage.
' '38
These rules have been subjected to extensive analysis and inter-
pretation both by courts 3' and legal scholars, 40 and no attempt is
made in this Note to determine their precise meaning. It is not
clear, however, and perhaps it is even doubtful, that crop dusting
should be considered either "non-natural" or "uncommon" usage
of the farmer's land. Nevertheless, refusal to impose strict liability
merely because crop dusting may not come within the technical
definition of these rules would ignore the fundamental question: As
a practical matter, who ought to bear the risk of damage from crop
dusting operations?
Comparison of the two concepts
The technological advances of commercial crop dusting should
be encouraged by the law only if potential benefits to agriculture
far outweigh the necessary risks of unavoidable harm to others in
the community. Since the risk of damage varies tremendously among
agricultural areas, depending upon the type and amount of sus-
ceptible crops within the drift danger zone, 41 the law should en-
courage crop dusting in areas where the benefits do sufficiently
outweigh the risks and discourage it in other areas. The rule deter-
mining who is to bear the risk of loss from crop dusting damage
The place where all this occurs, the customs of the community, and the
natural fitness or adaptation of the premises for the purpose, all aro highly
important in determining whether the rule applies....
In short, what emerges from the English decisions as the true "rule" of
Rylands v. Fletcher is that the defendant will be liable when he damages another
by a thing or activity inappropriate to the place where it is maintained.
PnOSSFR, SELECTED Topics ON TBE LAw oF TonTs 135, 140-47 (1953). (Footnotes
omitted.)
38. See RESTATEmENT, ToTs § 519 (1938) which provides:
[The general rule is that] one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable
to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost
care is exercised to prevent the harm.
Section 520 defines an ultrahazardous activity as one which:
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of
others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage.
See also comment e to section 520.
39. See cases cited in Pnosszn, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TonTs 135,
149-64 (1953).
40. See Fridman, The Rise and Fall of Rylands v. Fletcher, 34 CAN. B. Rzv. 810
(1956); McBratney, New Trends Toward Liability Without Fault, 26 RocKY MT. L.
REv. 140 (1954); Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous Things, 61 HAnv. L. R-v.
515 (1948). See also authorities cited in note 46, infra.
41. This is probably the single most important factor, although climatic conditions
peculiar to a particular locality are also relevant in determining the degree of risk
that some unavoidable drift damage will occur.
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should promote this social policy, as well as impose the risk on the
party who in all fairness should, and is best able to bear that risk.
Three alternative courses are open to the courts: (1) to impose
liability on the defendants only if the spray was negligently app lied;
(2) to impose liability on the defendants for negligence, even if the
application was faultless, whenever the risk of damage was so high
that spraying was unreasonable in itself; and (3) to impose absolute
liability on the defendants for all damage proximately caused by the
crop dusting operation.
The first alternative clearly encourages crop dusting, but it goes
too far. Since damage can result from faultless application, this rule
would completely fail to discourage crop dusting even where the
risk of damage makes the operation unreasonable in the particular
locality. Moreover, this rule is subject to a more basic objection. The
hiring landowner, who will make the decision whether or not to
have his crops sprayed, need only balance the potential increase in
his income against the cost of having the crops sprayed. He is never
forced to consider the question that is essential to determining if
crop dusting is desirable in his locality; that is, whether or not
the potential benefits of the operation would sufficiently outweigh the
risks of resulting damage. Finally, this rule would force all the
losses from careful crop dusting operations on the injured party who
has no way of avoiding them or passing them on to others. - Even a
glance at the cases will reveal that these losses can be very exten-
sive.4 If the defendant-landowner were forced to bear the risk of
loss, he could treat it as a cost of the potential increase in crop
production." And since the landowner chose to spray his crops to
42. Liability insurance for the protection of those likely to be injured by aerial
chemical weed control is generally unavailable. See the discussion of available forms
of insurance, notes 50-53 infra.
43. See, e.g., Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957) ($2405.75);
Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) ($3864); Schultz v. Harless,
271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ($3928).
[In cases involving ultra-hazardous activities], because of its importance to the
public the activity is not considered unlawful, but absolute liability is imposed
either because the risk of harm is great or because an accident, while it is
unlikely to occur, would be catastrophic if it should occur.
Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HAv. L. REv. 72, 86 (1942). (Emphasis added.)
44. Scholarly proponents (whose ideas are reflected in some legislation and an
occasional judicial opinion) applaud liability without fault for good risk bearers.
Their argument usually runs this way: One who should kmow that his activity,
even though carefully prosecuted, may harm others, should treat this harm as a
cost of his activity.
Moasus, TORTS 247 (1953).
Fault is still no doubt the dominant principle of liability. There is a growing
belief, however, that in this mechanical age the victims of accidents can, as a
class, ill afford to bear the loss; that the social consequences of uncompensated
loss are of far greater importance than the amount of the loss itself; and that
better results will come from distributing such losses among all the beneficiaries
1959]
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further his commercial enterprise, knowing that others would neces-
sarily be subjected to risk of substantial damage, it is fairer that he
bear any resulting losses. 45
The second alternative, which would impose liability on the
defendant-landowner for spraying when the high risk of damage
to others made spraying unreasonable in itself, would force the
hiring landowner to consider the risk of damage when deciding
whether or not to spray his crops. But in those cases where the
landowner's decision is not found to be unreasonable, the injured
party must still bear the burden of unavoidable damage losses; and
the increasing popularity of crop dusting throughout the country
might make juries reluctant to consider the mere act of spraying
unreasonable, especially if crop dusting is a common practice in the
particular locality.
The third alternative- absolute liability -would, of course,
relieve the injured party of the burden of his losses. It would also
discourage crop dusting in areas where the risk of damage to others
is relatively high, since the hiring landowner would have a correla-
tively high risk of financial loss. But perhaps absolute liability would
discourage crop dusting altogether. If the individual landowner
were forced to pay for the resulting damage out of his own pocket,
he might refuse to do any crop dusting. However, if the cost of the
damage can somehow be spread among all the farmers who have
their crops sprayed, the individual farmer is never faced with the
risk of an overwhelming loss; each farmer need only consider
whether his potential increase in crop production will sufficiently
exceed his share of the total crop dusting damage. True, any rule
imposing liability on the defendant in cases where damage is not
caused by negligent application will discourage him from crop
dusting, but only to the extent that it would follow the doctrine
that "the defendant's enterprise, while it will be tolerated by the
law, must pay its way." 4
6
of the mechanical process than by letting compensation turn upon an inquiry
into fault.
2 HARPER & JAMES, Tm LAW OF TORTS § 14.3, at 794-95 (1956). (Footnotes
omitted.)
45. In discussing "enterprise liability without fault," Professor Ehrenzwcig has
observed that the proper inquiry is not whether the results of a particular act
were "reasonably forseeable," but rather "whether liability can be fairly imposed
upon the [defendant] in those cases because the harm was typical for its activities,
and thus calculable and reasonably insurable." EiRENzvEiG, NEGLIENCE WirnioV'r
FAULT 58. (Emphasis added.)
46. PROssER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 317.
This concept of enterprise liability without fault has been recognized by most torts
authorities. See, e.g., EMIENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 45, § 16; Monus, op. cit.
supra note 44, §4; Paossm, op. cit. supra note 22, at 317; Seavey, supra note 43,
at 86.
Referring to this concept in 1941, Professor Prosser wrote:
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Assuming some method of spreading the risk among all the hiring
landowners is available, or can be devised, the position taken by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Gotreaux case seems to be the
most reasonable approach to resolving crop dusting damage cases.
The next section of this Note will consider methods of spreading
this risk.
DISTRIBUTION OF Loss
Under the Gotreaux rule both crop dusters and hiring landowners
will be strictly liable for crop dusting damage.YI Either group can
In general, this new policy has found expression where, even though the
defendant's conduct is socially desirable, the danger which it threatens to
others is unusually great, and will be great even though the enterprise is
conducted with every possible precaution.
PNossEa, TORTs §56, at 429 (1941). Ten years later, Professor Ehrenzweig cited the
above quoted portion from Pzossmn, Tours with approval, stating that:
[The] rationale has become increasingly obvious: Exposing the community to
risk, rather than causation of the individual harm has become the basis of
[enterprise] liability.
Em ,zwacM, op. cit. supra note 45, at 55. These two authorities had apparently
agreed that the important test for the enterprise liability policy turned on whether
there was intentional exposure of the community to forseeable and unavoidable
dangers ("unusually great" dangers, in Professor Prosser's opinion). However, the
later edition of Professor Prosser's book, in turn citing Professor Ehrenzweigs book
with approval, added the italicized phrase to his statement of the policy:
This new policy frequently has found epression where the defendant's activity
is unusual in the community, and the danger which it threatens to others is
unusually great and will be great even though the enterprise is conducted with
every possible precaution.
Pnossmi, op. cit. supra note 22, at 317. (Emphasis added.) No explanation is given
for the change; perhaps it indicates a strong influence of the technical absolute
liability rules of Rylands v. Fletcher and the Restatement of Torts on this enterprise
liability doctrine. Whether or not the "unusualness" limitation will be applied
generally to the doctrine, there is probably no reason, aside from historical hang-
over, for applying that limitation to cases where there is: (1) commercial activity,
like crop dusting, that (2) necessarily involves a great risk to others (3) of extensive
damage (4) which cannot be avoided by any amount of precaution save abandoning
the enterprise. See Monms, op. cit. supra note 44, at 247; Seavey, supra note 43. See
generally Gregory, Loss Distribution in Torts, 45 VA. L. REv. 63 (1959); Niccolini,
Liability Without Negligence, 1954 INs. L.J. 527.
47. In Gotreaux the court held both the hiring landowner and the independent
contractor absolutely liable. The court recited a Louisiana statute providing: "Al-
though a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he can not
make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his
own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him." 232 La. at 377-78, 94 So.
2d at 294. The court was criticized for misapplication of the statute in 32 Tun.. L.
REv. 146 (1957). But case law establishes that the statute was not necessary to
holding the landowner liable. The landowner is absolutely liable even though the
crop duster is an independent contractor. See Stocker v. City of Richmond Heights,
235 Mo. App. 277, 132 S.W.2d 1116 (1939). The landmark Rylands v. Fletcher
case itself resulted in liability of a hiring landowner for damage caused by an
independent contractor. Although the contractor had been negligent in that case, the
Court of Exchequer said:
The view which we take of the first point [the landowners absolute liability]
renders it unnecessary to consider whether the defendants would or would not
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distribute the loss among the hiring landowners, in proportion to
the amount of crop dusting done, by obtaining some form of insur-
ance and charging that protection off as a cost of the spraying
operation.
Applicators' methods of insurance
Liability insurance covering crop dusting damage is the simplest
and most obvious means of protection for the applicator. The
periodic expense of this insurance could easily be shifted to his
landowner customers. However, since crop dusting is a peculiarly
hazardous business, most insurance companies have refused to
underwrite the crop duster's liability for damage from chemical
drift,48 although a few companies are willing to insure crop dusters
who are skilled and experienced in aerial spraying, provided all the
ordinary underwriting standards are met.49
A crop duster also may self-insure his own operations, either
because he cannot obtain liability insurance or because he is willi
to gamble against extraordinary losses to avoid paying the high
insurance premiums. The self-insuring crop duster would first esti-
mate what his damage experience is likely to be over a number of
years. Then, by creating a reserve for damage liability and periodi-
cally expensing a proportionate amount of that reserve, he could
distribute the cost of his self-insurance to his customers through the
price he charges for his services. Of course, self-insurance affords
adequate protection only to the applicator who has sufficient capital
to withstand a substantial loss at any time.
Hiring landowner's methods of insurance
The landowner could avoid the danger of extensive financial loss
from crop dusting damage if liability insurance were available to
be responsible for the want of care and skill in the persons employed by them,
under the circumstances stated in the case.
See Bluhm v. Blanck & Cargaro, 62 Ohio App. 451, 24 N.E.2d 615 (1939), whero
the court held that an independent contractor who was blasting during construction
work for a city was absolutely liable and was not protected by the city's immunity
from such liability.
48. A survey was taken of the twenty-five leading insurance companies in the
United States that underwrite liability coverage for property damage other than
that resulting from automobile accidents. Of the companies replying, not one stated
a willingness to insure crop dusters, although several referred to special aviation
insurance groups who would, under the proper circumstances, issue such coverage.
49. Some insurers will write such coverage, but only on an individual rather than a
class basis, and only after careful consideration of the particular crop duster and
his intended activities. Interview with Mr. William Peet and Mr. Paul Kennedy of
Marsh & McClennan, Inc., insurance brokers, Minneapolis, Minn., January 14, 1959.
The imposition of absolute liability in crop dusting cases would probably increase,
rather than decrease, the availability of liability insurance coverage to the applicator,
since the additional demand for such coverage would encourage insurers to under-
write the risk.
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him, although he might be forced to pay twice -once in the added
cost of the spraying service necessary to cover the contractor's
liability insurance, and again in the premium for his own policy. But
a farmer's comprehensive liability policy will almost invariably
exclude damage from aerial crop dusting, and normally the com-
panies are unwilling to extend insurance coverage to include this
type of damage.5 However, a company insuring the independent
contractor hired to spray the crops may be willing to include the
landowner as an additional insured under the contractors policy,
for a nominal additional premium. 51
Even though liability insurance may be unavailable, the land-
owner can protect himself against bearing the entire loss by insisting
that the contract with the applicator provide for indemnification
of any amounts the landowner is forced to pay to satisfy his liability
for crop dusting damage. This type of indemnity provision is prob-
ably the only kind of protection available to the landowner who
cannot obtain liability insurance coverage.
CONCLUSION
To determine whether chemical weed control by aerial crop
dusting should be employed in a particular community, without
unreasonably discouraging all crop dusting, the law must force
farmers to weigh their potential gains against a proportionate share
of the risk of damage loss. To this end, the following legislation
would be desirable. First, the states should enact statutes maldng
applicators absolutely liable for all crop dusting damage. Second,
applicators should be required by statute to carry adequate liability
insurance, or, in the alternative, to post a bond assuring financial
responsibility adequate to cover crop dusting damage.5 2 These
50. One of the insurance company replies received in the survey (see note 50
supra) stated:
If [the spraying] operation is conducted on land, the Farmer's Comprehensive
policy would cover the farmer's legal liability for damage to property of others.
The policy excludes injury to or destruction of property arising out of any sub-
stance released or discharged from any aircraft in connection with dusting or
spraying operations.
51. The same letter referred to in note 50 supra also stated:
While our company does not write, other than through pools, direct Aircraft
Liability insurance, we usually recommend that the farmer secure his coverage
by being named as an additional insured under the contractor's Aircraft policy.
Since we do not write the Aircraft Liability coverage, we are not familiar vith
the additional premium required, but our understanding is that the farmer may
be named as an additional insured on the contractor's policy at a nominal
additional premium.
52. Almost half of the states have existing legislation for the regulation of crop
dusters. These generally require the applicator to obtain a permit and submit his
equipment for inspection, and in many states to submit reports of his activities. See
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3871 to 3-385 (1956); CAL. Aciuc. CODE §§ 160.1-
160.96; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-14-1 to 6-14-14 (1953); IDAO CODE AN,.
§§ 22-2208 to 22-2230 (Supp. 1957); KI,. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-901 to 3-910
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provisions would protect the injured property owners, and therefore
it would be unnecessary to also hold the hiring-landowners abso-
lutely liable for the damage. The burden of losses ultimately would
be distributed to the hiring-landowners through the cost of spraying
services.
Absent the suggested legislation, courts should adopt the Gotreaux
rule holding applicators and hiring-landowners absolutely liable for
crop dusting damage. This would force crop dusters who are unwill-
ing to risk ruinous loss either to voluntarily obtain liability insur-
ance, or to adopt reasonable self-insurance plans. The loss from each
occurrence of damage could then be forced onto the crop duster
by an indemnity provision in the spraying contract, or by inclusion
of the landowner under the crop duster's insurance policy. The
applicator can then distribute the loss among all farmers who have
their crops sprayed.
(Supp. 1957); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3:1621 (Supp. 1957); ME. REV. STrAT. ANN.
ch. 24, § 18 (1954); MINN. STAT. §§ 20.81-20.85 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 5000-21 to 5000-33 (1957); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 555.260-555.460 (1957);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-65.13 to 106-65.21 (Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
2, §§ 3-81 to 3-87 (Supp. 1957); Onm. REV. STAT. §§ 573.005--573.991 (1957);
S.C. AERoNAuTIcs COMM'N REGULATIONS, 7 S.C. CODE pp. 63-65 (Supp. 1958)
(promulgated under authority granted in S.C. CODE § 2-55 (1952)); S.D. LAWS
1953 § 22.12B01-22.12B08; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-609 to 53-618 (Supp. 1958);
TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 135b-4 (Supp. 1958); UTAI CODE ANN. W 4-4-14
to 4-4-28 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 186 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE §§
17.20.010-17.20.070 (1957); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-501 to 33-500 (Supp.
1957). Some of these require evidence of financial responsibility in the form of
liability insurance. See, e.g., NEv. RFv. STAT. § 555.330 (1957). Others require the
posting of a bond. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-378 (1956); Tax. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 135b-4, § 4(c) (Supp. 1958). Others without a specific provision
give the controlling state agency the power to require some form of financial responsi-
bility if it is found necessary. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.14 (Supp. 1957).
Some states have statutes prohibiting the dropping of objects from pianes in
flight. See, e.g., MINN, STAT. § 360.075(15) (1957) which provides that "every
person who . . . [while operating an aircraft] drops any object except loose water
or loose sand ballast . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." These statutes could
have some relevance to crop dusting if spraying or dusting were interpreted as
dropping an "object" within the meaning of the statute. The Wisconsin "falling
object" statute expressly excludes crop dusting operations, but only where those
operations are done in accordance with the Federal rules controlling them. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 114.095 (1957). As yet there have been no crop dusting damage
claims under these statutes.
See also 14 C.F.R. § 60.1-2, providing certain requirements for the obtaining
of Certificates of Waiver from Federal Air Traffic Rules in order to permit crop
dusting to be done at low altitudes.
